Total Visits

Friday, 26 July 2013

Lions led by Donkeys? IPPR report extracts

This report is so important in understanding the tremendous progress that the English Cause has made that I have prepared this. It is still quite long but has all the key things to note.



The IPPR is a Labour supporting “think tank” and was one of cheerleaders for the Labour Government’s attempt to break England up into regions. They are still trying and their latest scheme is for a Northern Parliament.

The report is written by:- 

Richard Wyn Jones is professor of Welsh politics and director of the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University 
Guy Lodge is an associate director at IPPR and co-editor of Juncture, IPPR’s quarterly journal Charlie Jeffery is professor of politics and vice principal for public policy at the University of Edinburgh 
Glenn Gottfried is quantitative research fellow at IPPR 
Roger Scully is professor of political science in the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University Ailsa Henderson is professor of political science at the University of Edinburgh 
Daniel Wincott is head of Cardiff Law School and co-chair of the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University.

So note that while there is some measure of academic professionalism that the report’s authors include not one single English patriot. The results are therefore all the more strking! Here are all the important extracts:-


As in 2011, at the first stage most 2012 survey respondents identified themselves as both English and British. However, more identified themselves as English (60 per cent) than British (58 per cent). And although the difference between these two groups reduced from 6 per cent in 2011 to 2 per cent, the level of British identity recorded was the lowest in any survey reported here (going back to 1996).

Only 10 per cent of respondents claim to be ‘more British than English’. In this sense there was no discernible post-Olympics ‘Britishness bounce’.

Although most people retain an overlapping English and British identity, what has emerged – as we argue in our previous report – is ‘a different kind of Anglo-British identity in which the “Anglo” component is increasingly considered the primary source of identity for the English’. What’s more, this trend has not gone unnoticed within England: when asked, 58 per cent agree that the English have ‘become more aware of English national identity in recent years’.

Further evidence of the strength of English national sentiment is provided by the most inclusive survey of them all, the (2011) Census. For the first time, the 2011 Census explored patterns of national identity across the UK by means of a question similar to the first part of the ‘forced choice’ question discussed above.

In England, fully 70 per cent of the population identified themselves either as solely English (60 per cent) or English in combination with some other national identity (10 per cent). In another finding that is in line with the 2011 FoEs, the census found only limited regional variation across England – with one significant exception – in the strength of English national identification. That exception was London. In the dual capital of England and the United Kingdom, while English national identity remains the most popular choice, Englishness was notably weaker than elsewhere and Britishness rather stronger.

What is particularly striking about the census data is the weakness of British national identity in England….. - Only 29 per cent of census participants identified themselves as feeling any sense of British national identity. ……. Although the census was taken before the Jubilee and the Olympics in 2012, the clarity of its findings on the strength of Britishness runs starkly contrary to the narrative of revivalism that we saw throughout last year.

That fully 40 per cent of people in England would, if given the opportunity, choose an English passport is striking, especially given the complete absence of any public debate around English citizenship. Nonetheless, even if England is emerging as a political community, Britishness remains a more important reference point for political identity for the people of England than for their neighbours in Scotland or Wales. This should, of course, come as little surprise given that debates about the notion of Scottish and Welsh citizenship are of long standing – be that explicitly through those nations’ respective nationalist parties, or implicitly through the actions of devolved government.

Is the rise of English sentiment confined to particular social and demographic groups? Across all age-groups, social classes and both genders Englishness is stronger than Britishness. The one important exception concerns members of England’s ethnic minorities.

Indeed, if the soon-to-be-published Scottish census data is consistent with expectations then the UK will be revealed as a state in which British national identity is not the main national identity in any of the three national territories of Great Britain.


Our 2011 survey revealed substantial dissatisfaction in England with how Scotland, in particular, is treated within the UK. Scotland was felt to receive more than its fair share of public spending (and England less than its fair share).

The strength of feeling in England is further illustrated by the fact that the number who say that Scotland gets more than its fair share of public spending has more than doubled in the last decade (from 24 per cent in 2002).

The English also overwhelmingly believe that public services delivered in Scotland should be funded by taxes levied in Scotland, and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English laws. While changes to the wording of the question mean that data from our 2011 and 2012 surveys are not strictly comparable (but do enable direct comparison with the longer BSA time series), the 2012 findings are nonetheless striking. Over three- quarters of respondents supported the proposition that the Scottish parliament should pay for the services it delivers out of taxes levied in Scotland, while more than 80 per cent agreed that Scottish MPs should not vote on English laws. Note also the intensity of feeling: 49 per cent and 55 per cent of English respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that, respectively, Scotland should pay its own way and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English matters.

These findings could prove particularly significant should Scotland vote to remain in the United Kingdom in 2014. All the major unionist political parties are committed to strengthening the powers of the Scottish parliament over and above those set out in the Scotland Act 2012. In designing a model of ‘devo-more’ for Scotland, the Unionist parties will surely need to reflect on the state of English public opinion presented here, if the model is to prove sufficiently versatile to work effectively.

That our English respondents believe that Scotland benefits disproportionately from the union is further underlined in their responses to a question that probed perceptions of the economic benefits of being part of the UK. When asked whether the English or Scottish economy benefits most from being part of the UK, just under a half of English respondents (49 per cent) point to the Scottish economy. In contrast, only 23 per cent of English respondents say that the English and Scottish economies benefit equally from membership of the union.

Also striking is the lack of trust in the UK government to act in England’s interests. As in the 2011 survey, around 60 per cent of respondents did not think that the UK government could be relied upon to do so, with 44 per cent trusting it ‘not very much’ and 18 per cent ‘not at all’…. 

Such sentiments are widespread across England. Although Londoners appear a little less dissatisfied than the English average, there is a striking regional uniformity in views. The overall message is clear: English dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo is both broad and deep.

Following the publication of The dog that finally barked, one question regularly posed to us was how salient were the questions of territorial governance that we highlighted within it? After all, survey participants may express dissatisfaction when specifically probed on an issue without necessarily regarding it to be a high priority. Our 2012 survey attempted to assess this by asking respondents to prioritise those constitutional issues that they regard as requiring ‘urgent action or change at this time’. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the UK’s relationship with Europe was accorded highest priority. But, strikingly, the question of ‘how England is governed now that Scotland has a parliament and Wales has an assembly’ was in a clear second place, well ahead of a range of other constitutional issues – including voting reform, reform of local government and the House of Lords, and even the position of Scotland within the UK – to which the political system itself has accorded much higher priority in recent years.

Equally, English Independence might be seen as a potential response to the electorate’s call for action. We broached this possibility for the first time in our 2012 survey and garnered an intriguing response. Despite no significant political party or actor advocating this option, those supporting the proposition that ‘England should become an independent country’ (34 per cent) were only narrowly outnumbered by those in opposition (38 per cent). And when asked how they would respond if Scotland were to vote to become independent, a plurality (39 per cent, compared with 33 per cent who disagreed) then said that England too should become independent.

Putting to one side the (currently unlikely) possibility of English independence, our 2012 survey included several questions designed to probe respondents’ views on how England should be governed. Responses to these questions confirm:
• low and decreasing support for the status quo
• very low support for English regionalism
• strong support for a form of governance that treats England as a distinct political unit
• continuing lack of consensus about which English option is appropriate

It confirms low support for the territorial status quo, at 22 per cent. And in combination the two ‘English options’ again garner majority support with, again, English votes on English laws winning the backing of the largest group. It also confirms that, even when considered alongside other options, there is some support for English independence.

At this point it may be tempting to conclude that our previous caution in arguing that views in England have not coalesced around a particular ‘English option’ is misplaced or outdated. Should ‘English votes for English laws’ now be considered the favoured alternative to the status quo? When respondents were asked to choose directly between English votes on English laws or an English parliament, they split their votes almost evenly – and both options were more popular than the status quo. Perhaps the clearest finding from these responses is that the status quo is not much of an option. Moreover, on a variety of question wordings, the status quo is consistently less favoured than alternatives which would give some form of institutional recognition to England as a whole.


The final and perhaps most significant claim highlighted in our previous report, The dog that finally barked, was that English national identity has become politicised. Specifically, our 2011 data suggested that the stronger a person’s sense of English identity, the more likely they were to be dissatisfied with the place of England within the post-devolution United Kingdom. Our 2012 survey data strongly confirms this conclusion.

It is clear, even in the context of high levels of overall discontentment, that those who identify strongly as English are more dissatisfied with those governing arrangements than those who feel more British. And the relationship between identity and dissatisfaction was at least as marked in 2012 as in 2011: it is unassuaged by any post-2012 Jubilee/Olympics glow.

It is clear that the ‘English options’ find most favour among those with the strongest sense of English national identity. Indeed, the status quo is the most popular option only among those claiming an exclusively British national identity. The status quo is the fourth most popular constitutional option among those who feel exclusively English, trailing not only English votes on English laws and an English parliament but even English independence outside the EU.


This section is concerned with how English attitudes towards the European Union relate to attitudes towards England’s other union, the UK.


The EU is very unpopular in England. When asked whether they considered the UK’s membership of the EU to be a ‘good thing’ or not, 43 per cent of respondents held a negative view of membership, compared to 28 per cent with a positive view.

And when asked how they would vote in a referendum on continuing UK membership of the EU (and holding such a referendum is favoured by 67 per cent of respondents) the verdict was even more decisive. Fully half would vote for the UK to withdraw, only one- third to remain.

These figures throw prime minister David Cameron’s manoeuvring around a possible future referendum on EU membership into stark relief. His is an extraordinary double gamble. First, unless he can bring home a significantly altered relationship with the EU, the English might well vote to leave. Second, recent polling in Scotland suggests the Scots think rather differently about Europe, and these differences could impact significantly on the independence debate.

For example, in February 2013, Ipsos-MORI found that 53 per cent of Scots would vote in a referendum to stay in the EU and 34 per cent to leave – almost a perfect inversion of the English views revealed in FoEs. Just as strikingly, a Panelbase survey for the Sunday Times in May 2013 found that 44 per cent of Scots would be ‘very’ or ‘quite’ likely to vote for Scottish independence ‘if the UK was looking likely to vote to withdraw from the EU’ and 44 per cent very or quite unlikely to vote for Scottish independence in the same situation. Most polls have shown that about half of Scots intend to vote ‘no’ in the independence referendum next year compared with only a third or so who intend to vote ‘yes’. But Euroscepticism elsewhere in the UK could potentially narrow that gap if Scottish people feel they could be dragged out of the EU against their will. Ipsos-MORI’s polling reaffirms the point. Asked ‘regardless of how you intend to vote in the Scottish independence referendum’ whether or not ‘an independent Scotland should be a member of the European Union’ 61 per cent favoured membership (including 59 per cent of those who intended to vote ‘no’ to independence) and only 33 per cent favoured Scotland not being an EU member. English Euroscepticism may be as much of a challenge to the UK’s own union as is Alex Salmond.

As we have already discussed, Englishness as a national identity has both strengthened over the last decade and become increasingly politicised. Yet conventional wisdom would set this tide against that of Euroscepticism, which has historically been strongly associated with the symbolism and rhetoric of Britishness. Traditionally it is the Union flag rather than the cross of St George that is waved by members of Ukip, the UK Independence party, which has grown dramatically in prominence as the standard-bearer of Euroscepticism in the UK.

Yet our data shows a strong, consistent and unambiguous link between Euroscepticism and English, rather than British, national identity. For example, when asked whether or not UK membership of the EU is a good or bad thing, negative views are much more prevalent towards the more English end of the identity spectrum. Conversely – and again counter to received wisdom – attitudes to European integration are notably more positive among those with a more British identity. It is British identifiers who are the Europhile group in England.

The association between English identity and Euroscepticism (and conversely between British identity and more positive attitudes to the EU) can be further illustrated by the relationship between national identity and voting intentions in an EU referendum. Support for leaving the EU is much higher at the English end of the identity spectrum; a plurality of those with a mainly or exclusively British identity support continuing membership.


Having established Euroscepticism in England as something associated with English – and not British – identity, we now turn to explore the relationship of Euroscepticism to what we might term ‘devo-anxiety’ among the English.

As the tables show, in each case, those who adopt the Eurosceptic position (regarding EU membership as a bad thing; indicating they would vote for UK withdrawal from the EU; and regarding the EU as having most influence over the way England is run) are also notably more dissatisfied with the constitutional status quo in the UK.

Even in the context of questions that reveal substantial discontent across the population as a whole – those concerning Scottish MPs voting on English laws and the absence of a clear relationship between tax and spending in Scotland – Eurosceptics are clearly those most likely to harbour such discontent. And they do so extraordinarily emphatically: at levels approaching unanimity of response which are very rarely seen in social surveys.

Attitudes towards England’s two unions, therefore, are clearly linked: Euroscepticism and devo-anxiety are two sides of the same coin of English discontent.

Euroscepticism is also clearly associated with a demand for greater recognition for England in the UK’s own constitutional arrangements. Eurosceptics are strong advocates of a clearer institutional demarcation of their country within the UK. It is only the least Eurosceptic respondents who offer plurality support for the current constitutional position. By stark contrast, for more Eurosceptic respondents the status quo is the fourth most popular option, trailing behind English votes on English laws, an English parliament and an independent England outside the EU.

In short, although political commentary – especially around the rise to prominence of Ukip tends to portray Britishness as being in tension with European integration, our findings show clearly that it is those with the strongest and most exclusively British sense of national identity who are most supportive of the EU. Euroscepticism is concentrated most heavily among those with a more English sense of national identity. It is English, rather than British, hackles that rise in response to Europe, just as it is those who identify more strongly as English who feel most aggrieved by the perceived iniquities of devolution and wish to give England some explicit recognition within the UK.


Given the substantial discontentment in England with the territorial status quo, it is unsurprising that these sentiments are observable among supporters of all political parties. But there are also important differences between supporters of the different parties. In general, we find Liberal Democrats at one end of the spectrum and Ukip supporters at the other. The former are the most British in terms of national identity and (ironically, given their party’s long history of campaigning for constitutional reform) the most content with the constitutional status quo both within the UK and vis-à-vis the EU.

Equally ironically, given their party’s Union Jack-bedecked symbolism and British rhetoric, Ukip supporters are by far the most English in terms of national identity and are by far the most strongly discontented with both of England’s unions, favouring major constitutional change both domestically and in the UK’s relationship with the EU. Conservative supporters share much common ground with Ukip and count, likewise, as constitutional radicals. Labour supporters are on average the most evenly spread in terms of identity and constitutional views (or, to put it less charitably, are the most divided).


The first point to note is that party support in England is clearly associated with national identity. It is only Liberal Democrat voters in England who are more likely to prioritise their British identity (and even among this group it is only very marginally the case). By contrast, Labour voters place more emphasis on their Englishness than on their Britishness: while a plurality say they are equally English and British, far more of their supporters can be found at the more exclusively English end of the scale (31 per cent) than at the more exclusively British end (19 per cent). However, the strength of English sentiment is most striking among Ukip and Conservative supporters. Fully 55 per cent of Ukip supporters, alongside 43 per cent of Conservatives, favoured the two ‘more English’ options. While the majority of supporters of all parties choose some form of overlapping Anglo-British identity, for Tories and Ukip supporters the English end of the spectrum is clearly favoured.

Intriguingly, a substantial majority of Ukip supporters would choose English rather than British as their passport nationality. This is in stark contrast to the position among Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters (although even here, around a third would choose English as their passport nationality.) Conservative supporters were much more evenly divided with a narrow plurality favouring the British designation. Once again, the overall picture is that while supporters of all parties consider themselves both British and English, Englishness weighs more heavily among Conservatives and, in particular, Ukip supporters.


Turning to our measures of devo-anxiety, we again find some striking differences between party supporters. Discontent is widely shared, but is felt particularly strongly among Conservative and, especially, Ukip supporters. The strength of feeling here is very striking: 67 per cent of Conservative supporters and 84 per cent of Ukip supporters agree strongly with the proposition that Scottish MPs should be denied a vote on laws that affect England only. Only in relation to levels of trust in government working in the English interest does the prevailing pattern of discontent vary: here, Conservatives (but less so Liberal Democrats) are notably more trusting in the UK government, suggesting that this question is, at least for supporters of the senior partner in the Coalition government, acting as a proxy for partisan support.

While attitudes towards the UK’s internal territorial constitution reflect varying levels of discontentment, those towards the EU reveal sharper contrasts between party supporters. Liberal Democrats tend to view EU membership positively, while Labour supporters are evenly split. By contrast, Conservatives are overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, regarding UK membership as a ‘bad thing’ by a margin of five-to-two. They are even more likely to vote for UK withdrawal in a referendum.

However, and as might be expected, Tory attitudes look moderate when compared to those of Ukip supporters. Indeed, the proportion of Ukip voters who would vote ‘no’ to EU membership in a referendum – 91 per cent – is close to unanimity. Equally striking is the finding that fully 69 per cent of Ukip voters believe that the EU has the greatest influence over the way that England is run; among Liberal Democrats, by contrast, the equivalent figure is only 18 per cent. In sum, partisan perceptions of and views about ‘Europe’ differ starkly.

By contrast, Conservative and Ukip voters are the least enthusiastic about the status quo, the latter in particular. With the one aforementioned Labour exception, ‘English votes on English laws’ is the plurality option across party supporters whatever the menu of options offered – and again by some margin among prospective Conservative and Ukip supporters. Among Conservatives, support for an English parliament – the more ambitious option – rivals that for the status quo, while among Ukip supporters an English parliament is very much more popular than the status quo. Such is the disdain among Ukip supporters for the current order that even support for English independence (outside the EU, of course) is more popular than the status quo. But in terms of how the Coalition government might respond positively to calls to address the English question, the clear plurality support among Liberal Democrat supporters for ‘English votes on English laws’ is probably at least as significant.

Our findings show that Ukip support reflects English discontentment with the political status quo – and not simply with ‘Europe’. The breadth of this discontent, as outlined here, has recently enabled Ukip to overtake the Liberal Democrats in poll ratings and to secure a ‘projected national share’ of 24.8 per cent of the vote in the May 2013 local elections – elections that also gave the party a meaningful local government presence for the first time in much of England.10

Yet in the only local elections held outside England in May 2013 – in Ynys Môn, in north- west Wales – Ukip actually saw its vote decline significantly. Similarly, in European parliament and UK general elections since 1999 (when Ukip first emerged as a reasonably significant player) Ukip’s performance in Wales and (especially) Scotland has consistently lagged well behind that in England; in the June 2013 Aberdeen Donside Scottish parliament by-election Ukip lost its deposit despite a highly publicised campaign spearheaded by Nigel Farage. It is those who feel most English and most discontented with the territorial status quo who are flocking to the Ukip banner in increasing numbers. Ukip might better be described as England’s nationalist party than the UK’s independence party.

Two points stand out. The first is how poorly the established parties perform: not once does their combined total represent more than 45 per cent of respondents. Indeed, in both June 2011 and November 2012, the proposition that ‘I do not think that any party stands up for the interests of England’ was the most popular choice.

By April 2013 that had changed, bringing us to the second point: the rise of Ukip as the champion of English interests. Viewed in the light of this finding, the party’s strong performance in the local elections just a few weeks later is unsurprising. ‘England’s nationalist party’ is on a roll. Since June 2011, it has more than doubled its support as the party that best stands up for English interests, and in April 2013 was the top choice among respondents in England. Ukip’s rise in this context will be of particular concern to the Conservatives. Those who reported in FoEs 2012 having voted Conservative at the 2010 UK election are split on which party who they believe best stands up for England: while 38 per cent say the Conservatives, almost as many (34 per cent) say Ukip – and this figure has almost doubled from 18 per cent in 2011, hinting at the potential for Conservative electoral support to drift over to Ukip.

Ukip – a party traditionally associated with espousing a 1950s-style British traditionalism – has been reluctant to play the English card, for fear it might muddy their position on Europe and weaken the union. But with its support so heavily concentrated in England and finding itself attractive to voters who are increasingly interested in a decidedly English strain of populism, it seems likely that it will seek to champion the cause of English nationalism more explicitly. Should it do so, it could further strengthen its appeal in England with potentially far-reaching political implications.

4.4 The political implications of Englishness

We argued in The dog that finally barked that politics in Westminster’s ‘bubble’ had paid insufficient attention to the strengthening of Englishness. That argument appears stronger still in 2013. Apart from isolated interventions – such as Ed Miliband’s 2012 speech on England11 (which sits rather uneasily with the ‘One Nation’ imagery he has otherwise evoked) – there are few signs that mainstream politics has woken up to the emergence of an English political community defined by a distinct English identity, its devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism, and its support for English political institutions.

There are various reasons for this. Much of the political class remain in denial, failing to acknowledge the trends identified in this report, or refusing to admit their salience. Others prioritise Scotland, fearing that engagement with the ‘English question’ may in some way strengthen the hand of Alex Salmond ahead of the Scottish independence referendum. It would seem a little odd, though, if advocates of Union refused to talk about its largest constituent part at a point when in Scotland the very terms of union are being challenged. Where is the English perspective – which is not the same as the Westminster perspective – on what the UK union is and should be?

Another factor is a sense of trepidation about what contemporary Englishness stands for. For some, Englishness seems to be regarded as a dark and chauvinistic force, best kept under wraps. The evident association of English discontentment with the right-wing populism of Ukip may well reinforce that concern. In particular, progressives may be reluctant to engage with the emerging English agenda for fear of legitimising what they see as the grievances of ‘little Englanders’.

This, we believe, would be a serious error. The issue is not going to go away. This is not merely because of the public attitudes identified in this report – although they constitute sufficient cause in their own right – but also because the continuing processes of renegotiation of the terms of union in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales will ensure that England, by default, becomes ever more clearly delineated as a distinct political arena. Any decision to ignore English discontentment for fear of guilt by association with right-wing populism is only likely to further feed such discontentment – and perhaps encourage it to develop more toxic undertones, if the perception grows that the political class is simply ignoring issues of real concern to people.

The challenge is for the major parties to take England seriously, and this appears easier for the Conservatives than Labour. Conservative supporters in England identify more strongly as English than Labour supporters, and are more anxious about devolution, more Eurosceptical, and stronger advocates of English political institutions. There is an obvious strategy of tacking more overtly towards these positions, not least to ward off the inroads Ukip is making in this section of the electorate. The Tories’ Byzantine manoeuvres on the question of an EU referendum around the 2013 Queen’s speech are an obvious, if clumsy, example of this strategy in action.

There is a bigger challenge for Labour. Some may review the data here and conclude that Englishness is natural territory for the right and should not be a ground on which Labour competes – especially if a ‘more English’ Labour might undermine the party’s standing in Scotland and Wales. Yet the importance of Labour’s strength outside England is easily over-stated. Labour has never won a stable and enduring parliamentary majority without winning a majority of seats in England – Labour needs to win in England to win UK elections.

So there is no alternative but for Labour to contest the changing England described in this report. It needs to find a distinct, progressive platform from which to secure and develop its strength in England – or risk leaving ‘Englishness’ to become ever-more- closely associated with the political right. It needs to recognise that its supporters also – if currently less emphatically than Conservative and Ukip supporters – have a strong sense of English identity, embrace English national symbols, and share concerns about devolution and Europe.

Doing so, of course, represents a serious challenge for the political parties that contest elections in England and for a political system that has thus far failed to provide a distinctive platform for England’s concerns and growing discontents. But the English discontentment with the status quo that is revealed in this report is so substantial that political leaders cannot afford to avoid the issue any longer.

The conclusions of the report highlight the fact that the primary concerns of the authors and of the IPPR are how all this affects Labour. We need not be worried by that but the Report does show that the English are awakening! For any English Nationalist that can only be a good thing, even if there is confusion about UKIP!


  1. When a divorce is being discussed, both parties should get their say.

    Next year, Scotland is voting between "Independence" (i.e. Split) and "More Devolution" (i.e. More Separation). Where is England's voice?

    The Nationalists in Northern Ireland are calling for an NI Referendum at the same time.

    We should ALL get a vote on continuing with the Union. That's the only way we are going to get Westminster to seriously consider English Governance.

    On September 18th 2014 there should be a UK-wide vote on Independence or Continuing Union.

    It unacceptable that only the Scots get to decide, it's just another example of "the tail wagging the dog".

  2. It is telling that the English are so disregarded by the leftist/liberal political class that this IPPR group looking at an English issue is dominated by Celts, together with a few members of the British left leaning establishment, doubtless brim full of English self loathing. And then this group faithfully records that the English feel aggrieved at the status quo!

    Comment by Derek Armstrong, member of CEP, Campaign for an English Parliament.
    (System would only allow me to contribute as "anonymous")

  3. It's a shame that the rising sense of English identity and dissatisfaction with how the existing political parties treat England (still no English manifestos at elections)appears to benefit UKIP rather than the English Democrats. UKIP follows the Conservatives in that it does not want to become an English nationalist party. It is in fact a 'Britain-is-England' party, not so much for Little England as Greater England. It is a bit of a paradox that both UKIP and the Conservatives refuse to serve their own customers.

  4. It is not 'England's nationalist party' that is on a roll, but Ukip, the pro-British, anti-English party

  5. Come on English Democrats, broadcast the truth about Ukip and root them out of Boston and Skegness.

  6. Labour would be unable to support any form of Englishness because they are a socialist organisation. You simply cannot be English and socialist as they are opposing ideologies. In socialism you must surrender your individual freedom to become part of the 'union'. Being English is to have freedom of speech, freedom of thought and freedom of action, none of which are acceptable under a socialism.

    1. Ed Milliband's father, Ralph, arrived on our shores stating his hatred of the British but with a determination to use England as a testbed for his Marxist revolution. He knew, as do all his fellow socialists that, as Brecht said, if the people will not make revolution you have to change the people and that is what they are doing. He knew that what he proposed was alien to the English character but he did not care. Job almost done he chose to be buried near Karl Marx.

      The English are not alone, however, the lust for freedom and democracy are a feature of all the countries bordering the North Sea and are part of the reason that they became protestant rather than remaining within the orbit of Rome. However, these countries do also have a history of social interaction, hence the high profile of charities and volunteering here.

      Anglo-Saxon and Viking societies were characterised by their tribal and feudal nature, all working together for the common good. This is why certain aspects of socialism do appeal to the Anglo-Saxon psyche, such as the national health service; but international socialism seems alien to these peoples. Hence the turmoil in the countries of Scandinavia where the thinking is that multiculturalism is a utopianist and desirable aim whilst it conflicts with the tribal nature of their societies.

    2. You could be a national socialist, but Hitler made that a dirty word.

  7. I have said this from day one ENGLAND should have HOME RULE

    AND now in the last five years, saying INDEPENDENCE ! stuff the English Parliament INDEPENDENCE NOW !

    The signs are their for everyone everywhere ! especially after a future King is NAMED GEORGE !

    1. Well, yes; but let's hope that he is more inspiring as a king than his six predecessors of the same name who were either mad, profligate, controlling or rather weak.

  8. If Scotland votes for independence with a majority of Scots wanting to stay in the EU (for the money) and a majority of English wanting to get out then Nigel Farage will be forced to become an English nationalist. After all, he will not sway the Scots over the EU, especially as they see him as smarmy and southern English and a Conservative. Quite what will happen with regard to the thousands of Pakistanis flocking into Scotland is unclear. After all, both the Scottish Nationalists and Labour are in favour of it if not more and civic nationalism for Scotland. I have heard comments from Scots about what is happening to Glasgow. But then that is up to them if they become independent. If the Scots don't like it then they are likely to be more vocal than the English dare to be.

    Where this will leave Wales and Northern Ireland I am not sure as the late Frank Carson was one of UKIP's greatest supporters.

    UCAS has stated that there are now more Asians and blacks applying for university than ethnic English. The Asians are pushed in that direction by their parents, the blacks may be being pushed in the name of equal opportunities. However, presumaby all will expect to have the best jobs when they graduate. This is further proof of the ethnic English becoming an underclass in their own country. There was a comment elsewhere about the indigenous English working classes being cleansed from London in 20 years' time. This is when the cockney accent is due to disappear to be replaced by an afro-asian patois. Instead of working classes while don't they just say the cockneys, gone from their own city in 70 years after at least 700, if not 1400.

    It will be insteresting to see what becomes of these developments; as to whether the ethnic English will just evacuate their country as they have their capital or whether the worm will finally turn.

    1. According to yesterday's Times, nearly all the Cockneys have moved to Essex.

    2. London has been lost. The rest of England must not be surrendered. The problem has to be contained within London, which is now a foreign city, not even a European city.

      As it says in the IPPR report, London is the only place where the population declares itself to be British, not English.

    3. It is automatically assumed that London is a net contributor to our economy, but no one has done any research. The money going to the so-called Celtic countries pales into insignificance compared to what is poured into London from the rest of England. Also, London is a drain on the resources of the rest of England by drawing talent away from the provinces.
      Why should the rest of us be paying so much towards London(istan) which has become virtually a foreign city/country?

  9. It seems recent immigrants are getting into social housing ahead of the rest, while the native English are left waiting for years on housing lists. Now we are told to brace ourselves for a wave of refugees from Cameron's proxy war in Syria.

  10. The cockneys are not only in Essex. They have moved out to the outer fringes and if they still work in London have to spend vast sums getting to their place of work, even to do manual jobs. Many have gone to places like Luton which now has a White British minority. London is like a nuclear explosion with the mushroom cloud expanding rapidly across the whole country. It was nice of the Times to admit that the cockneys have been ethnically cleansed from their own city, something Nick Griffin tried to point out on the Question Time programme and was harrangued by mostly non-ethnic English.

    Sometimes I wonder whether this Arab Spring is designed to send new waves of muslim "refugees" into Europe to further accelerate Europe's obliteration. A third of Europe's inhabitants are destined to be muslims before the middle of the century. I can no longer believe that all this is accidental and Peter Sutherland has made it plain that the UN's and those behind it's plan is to completely overwhelm Europe so that its homogeneous nation states are destroyed.

    We are not alone, Sweden continues to take wave upon wave of muslim "refugees" and the Swedes like us are too afraid of villification or other threats to voice their opposition. Europeans are trapped by being labelled as uncivilised if they oppose what is planned.

    1. There is a way around this. Immigration from the EU can be stemmed under EU legislation if laws governing movements of people also apply within a country. Thus if a restriction is placed on people moving out of London to the rest of the country, then the same restriction can be placed on migrants being allowed to enter the country from the EU.
      Of course, only the English Democrats would be willing to pass that legislation, but in that eventuality the English Democrats would be in power and would simply withdraw England from the EU and escape the EU's free movement of labour law.

    2. If immigration can be confined to London, all is not lost, but the government's policy is to direct immigrants to cities throughout England. That is the great danger. Once the other cities are also lost, then the intention is to encourage immigrants out of the cities into the country. And hey presto, no more England.

    3. This whole situation has been ably assisted by Cameron who has refused to ratify UNC 169 on the grounds that England has NO indigenous people! There MUST be something we can do about this. Petitions don't work the last one submitted was ignored, We have a PM who has achieved what Hitler tried to do in that he has, via the backdoor, obliterated the English people. He will not protect this once great country and prevents us protecting ourselves and our families under law. Don't we the English have The Human Right to be recognised and is there a lawyer out there prepared to take the government on?

    4. Ironically, he has not done what Hitler tried to do because Hitler had no plans to ethnically cleanse England. Hitler thought of the English as cousins through their Anglo-Saxon blood. He wanted to invade to make England part of the Reich but otherwise, apart from rounding up Jews and dissenters would probably have left us intact.

      There is a gentleman called Gavin Boby, a solicitor, who is active in helping people to prevent the building of mosques in their areas. He has also offered to help those girls who were groomed and abused by muslim paedophile gangs to sue their local social services, police or even the government. Originally, I think he was a planning lawyer, hence his involvement in defeating local authorities in their bids to allow planning permission for mosques whether or not the locals object. However, he has obviously moved on in his offer to defend these girls so perhaps he would be prepared to enter the human rights field.
      Robin is the man with legal connections so perhaps he could contact him and ask him if he could offer to help. I think he is from the North-East of England.

    5. As regards the plan to relocate immigrants from London, Birmingham is shortly to have a non-White British majority. Bradford shortly after that; most of the industrial areas are rapidly being taken over as the original inhabitants move out to the small towns or the cathedral cities. I heard Douglas Murray's repost to a Greek gentleman who complained that the British were complaining about a few immigrants; it was that he didn't consider the White British being a minority in their own capital a few immigrants.

      As regards spreading the load, many immigrants themselves are chosing to get out of the inner city multicultural hells and hence are doing it themselves. But the government's chief ploy is to look for social housing in areas where the demand is less i.e. areas where there has not been a massive immigrant influx. So they move immigrants out to areas previously untouched by immigration, small country towns etc. I used to live in a small market town in the South of England - now being expanding by enormous proportions - which even 10 to 15 years ago was still one of those "white ghettoes" so hated by our multiculturally obsessed elites. All that is now gone as Ian Hislop's "dark clouds" drift across the country. By the way, my French friend remarked that he had just spotted his first Arab in his corner of Brittany; so we are not alone; this is a Europe-wide agenda designed to bring about, as Peter Sutherland said, the European multicultural (and totalitarian) superstate as a first step towards such a world-wide union. First you have to dismantle the racial homogeneity and historic and cultural identity of each individual nation.

      Recently I read a description of Ragnarok, the Norse Twilight of the Gods. It was interesting, it speaks of floods, fire, earthquakes until the whole earth burns and gods and men perish. However, this is followed by a new golden age. The whole is brought about by the evil spirit Loki who unites all the forces of evil to achieve this. It is interesting to see how this compares with Christ's second coming, the triump of Loki and the killing by him of Baldur, the perfect god. However, more interesting is the feeling that some have that we are approaching that time and that climatic disturbance somehow mirrors the overtaking of the world by evil; i.e. a small plutocratic elite who control the banking system and as somebody has recently pointed out the economies of all major countries. With all this immigrant cheap labour, why are we all bankrupt?

    6. Hitler set out to obliterate the Jews and some other peoples, but he had no intention of obliterating the English. What does that say about Cameron and his ilk?

    7. regarding Birmingham and Bradford soon having immigrant majorities, can't they be persuaded to move to London where the problem would at least be contained?

    8. More immigrant labour means that there are more people to share the wealth of the country, so each individual gets less, but those who live off the profit made from the many get more

    9. What are you suggesting? that the remaining ethnic English in London move to Birmingham and Bradford and the non-ethnic English to London. Boris Johnson would be happy as it would make London even more populous and he thinks all those people in London is just marvellous.

      However, doesn't this smack of separate homelands, of apartheid? We all know that that is wholly unnatural and against human nature. The Marxists would tell us that deep down we really want to live with people who are wholly different in race, culture and history than we are and all this birds of a feather flocking together is just a racist old wives' tale.

      I have just read that white children in America are now in a minority more quickly than expected. White adults are due to be in a minority there by 2040. The father of a former colleague used to say that everybody should stay in their own country. Perhaps everybody should just return to their own country, although Europe handling 150m white Americans might be a bit of problem.

    10. Let the non-natives move to London (where they'd rather be anyway), and let the English move out, if that is what they'd rather do (and it seems that is what they want to do because they are moving to Essex etc,)
      The government has a programme of 'dispersal' of immigrants to the remaining English enclaves. If reversing that is compared to the South African 'homelands policy' by this traitorous government and its liberal fellow travellers so be it.
      Not all the people who live in the USA are of English descent.
      A more realistic scenario might be a population exchange between England and Australia where the climate is largely unsuitable for Europeans with England's black and ethnic minorities being relocated to Australia which would better suit their genetic make-up, i.e., their higher levels of melatonin to combat the effects of the sun's rays

    11. As you say, the white population of the USA is diminishing rapidly, so Europe could probably cope with the returnees, especially if the Africans, Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis, Turks etc., also went back to their countries of origin.

  11. Just spotted this on The Commentator blog

    The Foreign Office backs Scotland's independence aspirations

  12. The Public Accounts Committee has declared the government's net migration figures to be farce.
    It seems that there is no count made of the numbers entering the country, or those leaving.

    1. My French friend told me that the population of France is now meant to be 65m, hence more than ours but in a country three times the size of England, which is now one of the most densely populated countries in the world - more so than India and Pakistan which are off-loading their surplus populations onto us. However, I remember the population of Britain in the 1960s being around 54m with the population of France about 2m below that, so that the population of France has increased more than that of Britain even in 40 to 50 years. But my French friend said that that is meant to be the population but nobody really knows how many people are leaving and more importantly entering the country. So they are in as much of a mess as we are. Luckily for them most of their Poles have now left again to go to Germany and not doubt here.

    2. France has a large Muslim population which probably has a lot to do with the increase in overall population.

    3. The reason wages are falling in this country is because the huge increase in the population means that there is less money to go around, so we are told.
      It is government policy to push wages down and push prices up using so-called quantitative easing (QE) as well as immigration.
      A lesson from history, wages rocketed after the black death, because labour was in short supply. Also, the black death killed people but it also finished off serfdom.
      This government is intent on bringing back serfdom under cover of its austerity policy, without which the economy would be in better shape than it is.

    The bus in the news was in Kilburn High Street, in Brent, north-west London; by Thursday there was nothing in Kilburn. That's fair enough: they're mobile; they're meant to move. Nothing outside Willesden station, nothing in Harlesden, nobody who had seen one.

    How many billboards are there? "Two." "Two in each borough?" "Two across all six boroughs."

    "None of the boroughs knew anything about it. No local council had been consulted. Even the police knew nothing about it. So the text says: 'Go home or get arrested.' Who's going to arrest them? [Immigration minister] Mark Harper?"

    The choice of borough is illogical: Ealing, Brent, Hounslow, Redbridge, Barking and Dagenham were apparently picked because they had either low levels of immigrants voluntarily leaving, or high levels. Rupa Huq, the former deputy mayor of Ealing and the author of On the Edge: the contested cultures of English suburbia, said: "They seem to be aiming for these Colonel Blimpish characters, with a rolled-up copy of the Telegraph under their arm, BUT SUBURBIA DOESN'T LOOK LIKE THAT ANY MORE."

    For anyone who is here illegally "Well, that poster's not going to change anything. Someone will see it, laugh at it, walk off and carry on being illegal."

    Three bus drivers – of the E2, the E7 and the E9 – all take the route that the billboard is supposed to take, but none has seen the billboard. One, who wished to remain anonymous, said: "I think it's good. I think illegal people should go home." He's from Afghanistan, but has had legal status here for 17 years. Elena, 28, is from Ethiopia originally, and lives here with her Dutch husband. She thinks it will take more than a poster campaign to make people leave. "I have been all over the world. I have seen people deported. They're dragged off the streets, screaming."

    Nobody's seen one. It is doubtful there are even two billboards; possibly there was one, for the photocall, and they claim another, to make it look like they didn't just do one for a photocall.

    If this is a pilot scheme, what does success look like? "It will be assessed broadly to see how successful it was on a number of levels." "What levels?" "They'll look at it to see how it's worked across the board." "What board?" "To see if it does what it set out to do." Are they counting the number of voluntary returnees? OR THE NUMBER 0F VOTES THE CONSERVATIVES TOOK OFF UKIP? Are they going to poll illegal immigrants on what influenced their decision to leave? Or poll UK citizens on how tough they think Conservatives are on immigration?

    1. I overhead a discussion recently when somebody said, we should be like Australia just take the immigrants we really need. Sadly, I don't think that is the case for Australia any more and they have had to take waves of muslim "refugees". However, the reply was, "It's much too late now, the stable door has been left open and the horse has bolted". Reading the above this is obviously the case. And what a typical place of arrogance from somebody from the sub-continent; we have kicked the English middle classes out of Ealing, they don't live in London's suburbs any more; as if it had all happened as an act of God and had nothing to do with him. Does he ever spare a thought for the English he and his compatriots have driven out of their capital and their country. Does he ever think what the reaction of those still in the sub-continent who still have a country of their own would have been if it had happened to them. Of course not, all he cares about is himself. He also got the title of his book wrong. It is no longer English suburbia, it is everybody's but that of the English.

  14. We English have a Problem helped and assisted by some Welsh Scots irish, Liberal Left of England
    The Rest carry on in there own world.

    We dedicated English, like minded People, should not waste anytime by slagging others off, coming up with all sorts of theories and ideas,you will get no-where.
    BLAME and NAME The ENGLISH POLITICIAN who is Elected in your Constituency.
    They do nothing for England and the English unlike the Welsh Scots are Irish representives
    We English should concentrate on gathering more support raising funds, to stand up against these treacherous "English-Politicians" who should be REPRESENTING US
    Yet, THEY are blocking our path for Democracy and Self determination.

  15. The imposition of immigrant populations on the English people is, to my understanding, illegal under Magna Carta which was specifically designed to prevent the King, (i.e. the Government of the day), from undermining the English peoples privileges. (Although it was Barons at that date we, the English of today, are the equivalent of the Barons).

    Similar rights are now embodied in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. ( One telling clause of this document, to which the British Government is a signatory, is as follows:-

    “Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests”.

    1. Yes but hasn't somebody already told us that Mr Cameron is well aware of this Declaration but refuses to accept that the English are an indigenous people, just like that expert on English dna the African American writer Bonnie Greer.

      As I have said previously it is no good appealing to the United Nations as the United Nations, as we have become aware, are behind mass immigration into Europe in order to destroy her hitherto homogeneous nation states in the name of the New World Order. So who do we turn to? Perhaps the following legal practice could help us too.

      Compensation lawyers Messrs Leigh Day, having got money out of the British government for members of the Mau Mau and then having turned their attention to colonial Malaya are offering to help former slaves in Surinam, the French and British antilles sue the Dutch, French and British governments for compensation. I am sure they are making a pretty packet out of this but if this continues then anybody from any former European colonial country will be jumping on the bandwagon and Europe is already bankrupt. Plus, all Europeans had ancestors who were slaves, either under the Greeks, Romans, Saxons, Vikings, Normans right through to the late Middle Ages and the Slavs are called that because they were the slaves par excellence. And the first slaves in America were white convicts. Then there were our ancestors forced to work as children in the textile mills. We could all be suing somebody. Why are our former slaves seeking compensation when we have paid out billions in aid and let them take our country over? Why can't they like the rest of us just get over it and make something of their countries. Haiti is one of the countries suing France, still on its knees after the earthquake whilst the French are adopting children from there to help.

      But as my French friend said, we have nobody but ourselves to blame for this reverse colonialisation as we continued to vote in the parties behind it. Only when the French like the English and the Dutch and the Danes and the Swedes and the Norwegians ditch the Cultural Marxists (i.e. all major European political parties ) and their one world plan will sanity return to Europe.

  16. Following his treatment by the Cameron Tories, millionaire Peter Cruddas could be looking for a party for which to raise funds. Might that party be the English Democrats?

  17. The reason everyone is seeking to sue the indigenous Europeans, (English, French, etc.), and we are sitting on our proverbial is because we have never resorted to law. Perhaps we, (English), need a Human Rights test case. Any legal beagles out there with an idea?